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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Respondent, James Carpenter (hereafter "Carpenter") owned a lunchroom 
modular building and an office modular building (hereafter "buildings"). Carpenter 
stored the buildings on the real property of Herbert Turrell and Marianne Turrell, 
husband and wife. Herbert Turrell subsequently passed away. Approximately two 
years later, the Appellant (hereafter "Turrell"), son of Herbert Turrell and Marianne 
Turrell took possession of the buildings and sold them to third parties without any prior 
knowledge, consent or authority of Carpenter. 
Carpenter filed suit against Turrell for conversion to recover the fair market value 
of the buildings from Turrell. Turrell responded to Carpenter's complaint by admitting 
Carpenter's allegation that Turrell " ... without Plaintiffs knowledge, authorization or 
consent sold one storage building to Leonard Turpin on November 26, 2006 and the 
other storage building to Dan Seldon on December 8, 2006." (See Turrell's Answer: 
Paragraph 5). Turrell also incorporated in his Answer an affirmative defense that 
Carpenter's claims are barred by Idaho Code §9-202(3). 
A trial was held and the Trial Court entered a Judgment for Carpenter concluding 
in pertinent part that: 
1. Carpenter as owner of the buildings has a gratuitous bailment relationship 
with Herbert Turrell and Marianne Turrell. 
2. That while Turrell had been acting as an agent for his mother, Marianne 
Turrell, Turrell without authority of Marianne Turrell personally assumed dominion and 
control of Carpenter's buildings and permanently deprived Carpenter possession of said 
buildings by the sale of the same to Seldon and Turpin. 
3. Notwithstanding Turrell's allegation he was unaware of Carpenter's rights 
regarding the buildings, the conversion of the buildings to his own use rendered Turrell 
liable to Carpenter due to wrongful conversion. 
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4. Idaho Code §9-202(3) was not relevant as a defense to Turrell's claim since 
Carpenter's lawsuit did not include a claim against the Estate of Herbert Turrell or 
Marianne Turrell personally. Therefore, any testimony regarding any agreement or 
conversation between Carpenter and Herbert Turrell is not barred by Idaho Code §9-
202(3). 
B. Statement of Facts 
Carpenter is the sole owner of Quality Modular Homes, a business involved in 
the buying and selling of modular homes. In May 2003, Carpenter purchased two 
buildings. (See Exhibit 3). During this time Herbert Turrell was a good friend and 
neighbor of Carpenter. They both lived on Yukon Road, Post Falls, Idaho 
approximately one-quarter mile apart. While in the presence of Dave Bouder and 
Herbert Turrell, Carpenter was unable to store the buildings on his property due to their 
size. Carpenter and Herbert Turrell had a conversation about the storage of the 
buildings on Herbert Turrell's property. Herbert Turrell allowed Carpenter to store the 
buildings on his property. (Tr 29, L 1-9). Carpenter and Dave Bouder made one trip per 
building to Herbert Turrell's property to store the buildings. While moving the buildings 
on the Herbert Turrell property, Herbert Turrell was present, observed the moving of the 
buildings onto his property and did not object or contest the placement and storage of 
the same on his property. (Tr 91, L 15-22). Herbert Turrell's wife, Marianne Turrell was 
not present during this time. (Tr 91, L 9-14). 
During this period of time Carpenter had built an addition to Herbert and 
Marianne Turrell's mobile home (Tr 72, L 17-18) and had moved three cabins from 
Lake Chatcolet to the Herbert Turrell property. (Tr 71, L-12-13, Tr 72, L-2). 
Herbert Turrell passed away in the early part of 2005. Carpenter testified that no 
funeral service was held. 
As referenced in the Turrell's Opening Brief, Herbert and Marianne Turrell lived 
on a five acre parcel on Yukon Road, Post Falls, Idaho. The property over time 
became a storage for just about anything that Herbert Turrell was able to collect, such 
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as old cars, scrap metal, etc. Most of the items stored on Herbert Turrell's property was 
not marketable except for salvage value. See Exhibit "D". The only buildings being 
stored on Herbert Turrell's property were Carpenter's buildings and the Lake Chatcolet 
cabins. Such items were readily distinguishable from the remainder of the "junk" on the 
Herbert Turrell property. (Tr 146, L 12-25). 
Marianne Turrell acknowledged that Carpenter and Herbert Turrell were friends 
and she observed both of them outside talking at various times but she never paid 
attention to what they talked about, nor was she ever involved in any of Herbert Turrell's 
affairs. (Tr 95, L 21-22; Tr 107, L 19-20; Tr 112, L 21-23) Marianne Turrell 
acknowledged that she was not aware of all the personal property on the property or 
even the buildings being on the property and that "everybody stored stuff it seemed 
like." (Tr 107, L 17). 
Subsequent to Herbert Turrell's passing, Carpenter showed the buildings to 
several perspective purchasers without success. During each showing, Carpenter 
always made contact with Marianne Turrell to advise her of his presence and purpose 
for being there (Tr 38, L-24-25; Tr 39, L 20-22). 
Carpenter also received a telephone call from Turrell regarding the status and 
sale price of the buildings after Turrell was contacted by an interested party. (Tr 42, L 
19-20; Tr 45, L 8-12; Tr 46, L 9-10). The buildings did not sell as a result of this 
contact. 
In 2007, Carpenter was driving by Marianne Turrell's property and noticed that 
the buildings were gone. Carpenter telephoned Turrell and left a message with Turrell's 
wife to call him about the status of the buildings. Turrell never returned Carpenter's 
telephone call. Carpenter called again and made contact with Turrell. Turrell told 
Carpenter that he had gave them away. (Tr 44, L 1-2). Turrell acknowledges that he 
did not tell Carpenter that he had sold the buildings. (Tr 125, L 16-18). 
Being in the business of moving buildings, Carpenter was able to trace the status 
of these particular buildings and determined that Turrell had sold the buildings to 
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Leonard Turpin and Dan Seldon. 
Upon being confronted by Carpenter with this information, Turrell finally 
acknowledged the sale of the buildings to Turpin and Seldon and did not dispute 
Carpenter's claim to ownership of the buildings during this telephone contact. (Tr 44, L-
11-19; Tr 171, L 1-12). 
In various attempts to legitimize Turrell's sale of the buildings, Turrell denied that 
he knew that Carpenter owned or made a claim to the buildings. Turrell felt that his 
father owned the buildings and wanted to attach the buildings to his mobile home. It is 
unrebutted that Carpenter built an addition to the mobile home. Carpenter further 
testified that the buildings would have had to been substantially altered and remodeled 
to pass code to render them habitable as an addition to the mobile home. (Tr 202, L 4-
17). 
Turrell also claims that he assumed the buildings were his father's because it 
was just like all the other junk stored on his father's property. (Compare Exhibits 1 (A-
H), 2 (A-E), with Exhibit D). 
Turrell's brother, Tom Turrell, testified that Carpenter telephoned him on three to 
four occasions to see when Carpenter could move the buildings to his brother's, Terry 
Turrell's property in Bayview, Idaho. Carpenter testified that he called Tom Turrell once 
to determine when he could move the Lake Chatcolet cabins (not the buildings) to Terry 
Turrell's Bayview property. Turrell did not proffer any testimony corroborating and/or 
confirming Terry Turrell's testimony in this regard nor acknowledge any knowledge of 
the telephone calls as alleged by Terry Turrell. (Tr 171, L 2-12). Turrell repeatedly 
testified that when he took possession of the buildings and sold them to third parties, he 
was acting either as a Personal Representative of the Herbert Turrell Estate or a 
Successor Trustee of the Turrell Living Trust (hereafter Trust). 
Upon being confronted by Carpenter as to the status/sale of the buildings, Turrell 
never indicated that he was acting as a Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Herbert Turrell and/or Trustee of the Trust. 
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The Trust was never registered with the Kootenai County District Court nor was 
Turrell's status as Successor Trustee of the Trust registered in any Court in Idaho. (Tr 
178, L 14-19). 
The record does not reflect any evidence other than Turrell's own self serving 
statements that he was acting a Personal Representative of the Estate of Herbert 
Turrell or that a formal probate of the Herbert Turrell had been filed either prior to or at 
the time of sale of the buildings. (Tr 166, L 14-15). 
Turrell sold the buildings to Leonard Turpin and Dan Seldon personally and 
executed sale receipts reflecting the sale of the buildings in Turrell's name only and not 
in his alleged capacity as either a Personal Representative of Herbert Turrell's estate or 
as Successor Trustee of the Living Trust. (Exhibits 4 and 5). 
Although Turrell was sure that all property located on Herbert Turrell's property 
was his father's, Turrell did acknowledge that his father stored some personal property 
as a friends residence in Rathdrum, Idaho. Like Carpenter herein, Herbert Turrell was 
also involved in a gratuitous bailment situation. (Tr 167, L 21·23; Tr 171, L 16-20). 
Notwithstanding the specific reasons Turrell tendered to the Trial Court regarding 
the conversion of Carpenter's buildings, Turrell acknowledged that not all the items 
stored on his father's property has been sold or removed (Tr 148, L 2-14) and Marianne 
is still residing at the home. (Tr 116, L 8-9). 
C. Appellant's Issues Presented on Appeal 
Turrell raises six issues on aP.peal which are summarized as follows: 
1. Issues 1 through 4 (Opening Brief page 9) can be summarized as follows: 
Whether Idaho's Dead Man Statute is applicable to Carpenter's claim of conversion 
against Turrell in the absence of any formal probate proceeding pending, or in the 
absence of Turrell formally documenting his status as Personal Representative or in the 
absence Turrell formally documenting his status Successor Trustee of the Trust at the 
time that he converted Carpenter's buildings to his own use and sold the same. 
2. Whether the Trial Court's finding of gross negligence is supported by the 
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evidence is a germane or relevant issue as it applies to the Trial Court's finding that 
Turrell was culpable of conversion. 
3. Whether Judgment was properly entered against Peggy Turrell, spouse of 
Turrell in light of the evidence that Turrell was personally involved in the conversion of 
Carpenter's buildings and failed to substantiate the status of the proceeds of the sale of 
said buildings. 
II. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
In addition to the issues raised by Turrell in his Opening Brief on Page 9, 
Carpenter contends that the following issue is germane: 
1. Whether Carpenter is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal since 
Turrell arguments simply request the Court to re weigh and/or recharacterize substantial 
competent evidence which substantiate as to the inapplicability of the Dead Man's 
Statute to the instant case. (I.C. §12-121, IAR 41). 
Ill. 
ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE 
BEFORE THIS COURT 
The standard of review applicable to this appeal has been summarized by the 
Court as follows: 
When a case has been tried to the Court without a jury, we will not disturb the 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a); In Re Williamson, 135 Idaho 452, 454,(2001); Rueth vs. State, 103 
Idaho 74, 77 (1982). In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, this Court 
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does not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses as to the Trial Court. 
Williamson, supra; Kootenai Electrical Coop., Inc. vs. Washington Power Co., 127 
Idaho 432, 434-35(1995). "The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions which are based 
on substantial although conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal." Sun 
Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. vs. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118 
(1990). "The Trial Court's Findings of Fact will be liberally construed in favor of the 
judgment entered." Id. With respect to the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law, we 
exercise free review Erickson vs. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430 (Id. App 2002). 
B. IDAHO DEAD MAN'S STATUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE 
Turrell's appeal primarily focuses on whether Idaho's Dead Man's Statute (JC§9-
202(3)) applies to a Trust vis a vis Turrell's uncorroborated and unverified testimony 
that at all times pertinent to his possession and sale of Carpenter's buildings, he 
perceived himself as a Successor Trustee of the Trust. 
The overwhelming evidence supports the finding of the Trial Court that Turrell 
was not a Successor Trustee at the time he converted Carpenter's buildings. The 
record fails to reflect an initial registration of the Trust or an Amended Registration 
designating Turrell as Successor Trustee of the Trust as required by Idaho Code §15-7-
101 et. seq. The sales receipts provided to Leonard Turpin and Dan Seldon, 
purchasers of Carpendter's buildings, reflect that Turrell was acting in his personal 
capacity. (See Exhibits 4 and 5). 
Turrell objected to any testimony proffered by Carpenter relating to any 
conversation with Herbert Turrell regarding the storage of the buildings on Herbert 
Turrell's property. The Trial Court concluded that "Idaho Code §9-202(3) is not relevant 
because the Estate of Herbert Turrell is not a party or a named Defendant in this 
matter." (R, page 72). The Trial Court did not conclude that" ... protection of Idaho 
Code §9-202(3) was available only to Personal Representatives formally appointed by 
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the Court." (Opening Brief page 10). Turrell's objection is not a barr to Carpenter's 
claim. There is no evidence that the Estate of Herbert Turrell was formally or informally 
probated or involved in the conversion of Carpenter's buildings. There was no factual 
basis to include the Estate of Herbert Turrell as a party Defendant herein. 
that 
Regarding the applicability of the Dead Man's Statute, Turrell does acknowledge 
" ... extrinsic evidence and the testimony of disinterested witnesses to the 
conversations or events giving rise to the claim can be presented, the interested 
party to the 'communication or agreement' is not permitted absence such 
testimony to testify as to what the decedent said or promised since to do so 
would allow opportunistic claims to make uncorroborated and fraudulent claims 
against the estate of someone who can no longer defend himself." (Opening 
Brief page 10). 
A disinterested witness, Dave Souder, corroborated Carpenter's testimony that 
Herbert Turrell acquiesced, did not object to and observed Carpenter moving two 
buildings on to Herbert Turrell's property to store the same. (P 89, L 11-16; P 91, L 15-
22). 
Turrell's appeal suggests that the Dead Man's Statute is a claims barr statute 
rather than an evidentiary barr statute. In this regard he had little choice. Turrell 
acknowledged that he converted and sold Carpenter's buildings. Turrell felt his only 
defense to Carpenter's claim was to suppress any conversation between Carpenter and 
Herbert Turrell regarding the storage of said buildings. In light of the gratuitous 
bailment situation, (R 71 ), Carpenter did not need proffer any hearsay testimony from 
Herbert Turrell. As corroborated by Souder, the facts are clear and uncontroverted. 
Carpenter purchased the buildings and moved them on Herbert Turrell's property on 
two separate occasions in the presence and without objection of Herbert Turrell. 
Rather than moving to dismiss Carpenter's Complaint for failure to join an 
indispensable third party or in the alternative joining the Estate of Herbert Turrell and or 
the Trust as a third party defendant, Turrell chose to personally defend this litigation. 
Turrel!'s status in this litigation is inconsistent with his attempt to hide behind guise of a 
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Trustee in an attempt to barr Carpenter's claim. 
Turrell fails to recognize statutory differences involved in probating an estate and 
the formalities required in the registration of a Trust. In this regard Turrell 
misrepresents the facts as it relates to the rationale of Idaho Code §9-202(3) (See 
Opening Brief page 11 ). Even if it is determined that Turrell was acting as a Personal 
Representative or as Successor Trustee, the terms and conditions of the Trust was that 
Estate would vest in the surviving Grantor (Marianne Turrell). As such, since there was 
still a surviving Grantor, Turrell was not acting" ... to wind up a decedent's estate and 
affairs." (Opening Brief page 11, Defendant's Exhibit "H"). Turrell consistently 
attempted to recite hypotheticals and other speculative arguments in his attempt to 
render Idaho Code §9-202(3) applicable. These attempts were unsuccessful before the 
Trial Court. 
The facts do not provide a proper predicate for this Court to consider Turrell's 
request in this regard. The Estate of Herbert Turrell and the Trust are not parties to 
this action. 
In the event the Court determines that the Dead Man's Statute did preclude 
Carpenter's testimony regarding any conversations he had with Herbert Turrell, such 
error is harmless. Substantial, competent and uncontroverted evidence exists that 
Carpenter stored the buildings on Herbert Turrell's property under a gratuitous bailment 
situation. Idaho Code §9-202(3) is irrelevant to this bailment status. 
Nevertheless, Turrell insists that: 
'This Court should according hold that the legislative intent to protect a 
decedent's estate from uncorroborated claims whether or not estate is subject to 
a formal probate and whether or not the Personal Trustee is a successor of an 
estate planning trust." (Opening Brief p 12). 
C. TIM TURRELL WAS NOT A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. 
Contrary to the requirements of Idaho Code § 15-3-301 et. seq or Idaho Code 
§15-3-401 et. seq, Turrell insists that the Trial Court erred in dismissing his claim that 
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he was acting as a Personal Representative of the Estate of Herbert Turrell when he 
sold the buildings. Turrell argues that the Trial Court did not have any law or evidence 
supporting its conclusion that "Tim had not been appointed by the Court in a formal 
probate proceeding." (Opening Brief page 12). 
The record is void of any evidence that the Estate of Herbert Turrell was either 
informally or formally probated or that Letters Testamentary were issued by the Court 
appointing Turrell as Personal Representative of the Estate of Herbert Turrell. The 
burden is on Turrell to substantiate such allegation. He did not. It is difficult to fathom 
what specific evidence Turrell refers to which would provide a basis for the Trial Court 
to determine that Turrell had been appointed by a Court" ... in a formal probate 
proceeding." 
Turrell merges and fails to distinguish the status of the Personal Representative 
of an estate vis a vis a Successor Trustee of a trust. In one instance he is asserting 
that he is a Personal Representative of the Estate of Herbert Turrell. In another 
instance he is asserting that he is the Successor Trustee of the Trust. Turrell's self-
serving statement were not corroborated by any other testimony and/or formal 
documentation as required by Idaho Code. The Trial Court's finding that Tim Turrell 
was not a Personal Representative is based upon Turrell's failure to verify this 
unsubstantiated allegation. 
Turrell has presented no authority to support his position that he personally had 
standing to barr any testimony pertaining to any conversation between Carpenter and 
Herbert Turrell pursuant to Idaho Code §9-202(3). Idaho Code §9-202(3) does not 
exonerate Turrell for the conversion of Carpenter's buildings. 
D. THE REAL QUESTION IS WHO IS ATTEMPTING TO BACKDOOR 
THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE 
It is an ironic twist of logic that Turrell is claiming that Carpenter is attempting to 
"backdoor" the Dead Man's Statute by filing a cause of action against Turrell personally. 
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(See Opening Brief page 13). 
A review of Turrell's testimony is replete with his attempts to "backdoor" the 
application of the Dead Man's Statute. The record is void of any factual foundation 
which sustains the relevance of the statute to his objections and arguments. It is 
unknown exactly to what extent and how the Dead Man's Statute applies to Carpenter's 
claim. Turrell has argued that it is a claims barred statute in one instance and in other 
instances argues that it is an evidentiary/testimonial barr statute. Even the Trial Court 
had a difficult time parlaying Turrell's application of the Dead Man's Statute to the facts 
of this case. 
Unfortunately, it is again necessary to respond to this issue by again reiterating 
that the evidence before the Trial Court directly contradicts Turrell's allegations. Turrell 
signed the sales receipts in his personal capacity. There was no informal or formal 
probate of Herbert Turrell's Estate. Turrell did not register his status as Successor 
Trustee of the Trust as contemplated by Idaho Code § 15-7-101 et. seq. (Tr 118, L 12-
15, Tr 156, L 21-23, Tr 178, L 14-19). A third party would not be able to verify either a 
probate of Herbert Turrell's Estate or the existence of a Family Trust. While Turrell's 
name appeared on his mother's bank account (Tr 107, L 1) so did his other brothers. 
(Tr 164, L 16-25, Tr 165, L 1-13). 
Notwithstanding Turrell's self serving statements pertaining to his perceived 
status as either a Personal Representative or a Successor Trustee, the Trial Court 
concluded that Turrell acted individually when he took dominion and control of 
Carpenter's buildings and sold them to third parties. 
In an effort to distract the Court and minimize his exposure, Turrell attempts to 
justify his behavior by alleging he was unaware of Carpenter's rights over the buildings. 
Such lack of knowledge as to who actually owns the buildings is irrelevant. 
Restatement of Torts (2nd) §222, 223, 224. Wiseman vs. Schaffer, 115 Idaho 537 (Ct. 
App 1989). 
Turrell also attempts to assume facts not in evidence by extending the rationale 
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of the Dead Man's Statute defense to preclude Carpenter's attempts to recover the 
buildings from Herbert Turrell's Estate in the event that the buildings still existed. 
(Opening Brief page 14). This argument fails in that it is premised upon facts which are 
irrelevant and not applicable to the instant case. In the event that the buildings still 
existed then it is obvious Carpenter would have had to file the suit against the Estate of 
Herbert Turrell and/or against Marianne Turrell personally. In this instance different 
facts would obviously been presented to sustain Carpenter's burden. Such an analogy 
is inapposite. 
Turrell cannot simply invoke the application of Idaho Code §9-202(3) by alleging, 
as an after thought, that he was unilaterally acting as a Personal Representative or 
Successor Trustee without any formal appointment confirming the same. (Opening Brief 
page 14). The Ko/ouch cited by Turrell (Opening Brief page 14) confirms a need for a 
formal appointment and to this extent is inapplicable to the instant case. 
This is not a case where " ... Carpenter ... successfully eluded the statute by 
suing Turrell as an individual." (Opening Brief page 14). This is a case where the Trial 
Court held that Turrell could not hide behind the Dead Man's Statute to barr Carpenter's 
conversations with Herbert Turrell pertaining to the buildings. 
E. WHETHER CARPENTER WAS ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE 
POSSESSION OF THE BUILDINGS IS IRRELEVANT 
Turrell argues that Carpenter was not entitled to immediate possession of the 
buildings and therefore his claim against Turrell must fail. (Opening Brief page 15). 
Turrell cites the Lusarcase as authority for the requirement of "immediate possession." 
Lusar is significantly distinguishable from the case at hand. It dealt with a cause of 
action between a trucking company which as pledger, pledged certain collateral to a 
secured party for a bond. The issue before the Lusar Court was whether the pledgor 
had the right to possession of the collateral at the time of demand and refusal of the 
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secured party to return the collateral. 
Lusar did not deal with a gratuitous bailment situation as in the instant case. 
Additionally, Turrell was not acting as a bailee of the buildings at the time of his 
conversion and sale of the same. Turrell's motives in this regard are irrelevant. 
Carpenter's cause of action against Turrell was premised on Turrell being a tortfeasor, 
not a bailee. 
Turrell has not cited any authority which would deny a bailor immediate 
possession of his property from the bailee in a gratuitous bailment situation. Even in 
the event that Turrell is able to cite authority to sustain his argument that Carpenter 
must show a right of "immediate possession" of bail property before the bailee can be 
culpable of conversion, Turrell lacks standing to raise this issue and his arguments in 
this regard fail. It is difficult to understand Turrell's logic that Carpenter would have to 
have a right of possession of the buildings superior to that of Turrell's prior to Turrell's 
personally converting and selling the same. Turrell simply had no rights of possession 
of Carpenter's buildings. 
F. PERSPECTIVE EXAMPLE 
Notwithstanding the various assumptions and arguments tendered by Turrell in 
support of his appeal, on page 16 of his Opening Brief, Turrell again attempts to explain 
and/or justify his appeal "by example". 
To the extent that such example sets forth additional hypothetical with rhetorical 
questions, no further comment or argument in this regard is necessary. 
G. TURRELL IS BEING HELD LIABLE NOT FOR A BREACH OF A BAILMENT 
CONTRACT BUT FOR CONVERSION OF CARPENTER'S BUILDINGS 
Turrell has erroneously interpreted the Trial Court's decision that Judgment 
entered against Turrell was premised upon a breach of a bailment contract. The Trial 
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Court's comments pertaining to the bailment status by and between Carpenter and 
Herbert Turrell serves as a predicate for its decision. In a gratuitous bailment, no 
contract exists. There was no specific bailment, gratuitous or otherwise between 
Carpenter and Tim Turrell. 
Neither the Estate of Herbert Turrell or Marianne Turrell personally converted 
Carpenter's buildings. The record is void of any evidence that Marianne Turrell knew 
what Herbert Turrell was doing with those buildings. (Tr 101, L 15-16, 18, Tr 107, L 19-
20). Marianne Turrell testified "everyone stored stuff there." (Tr 107, L 17). The record 
is void of any evidence as to whether Marianne Turrell even knew the buildings were on 
the property. (Tr 103, L 17-19). All Marianne Turrell knew was that Herbert Turrell and 
Carpenter had arrangements but she was not aware of what they were. (Tr 113, L 1-3, 
Tr 108, L 11-12). 
Turrell analysis of the Trial Court's conclusion that Marianne Turrell and Turrell 
were grossly negligent for selling the buildings is misplaced. Be it as it may, the Trial 
Court was commenting on an issue raised by Turrell. This particular comment was not 
alternative theory or a basis of the Trial Court's decision. The Trial Court's decision 
was premised solely on a finding and conclusion that Turrell personally exercised 
dominion and control of the building and permanently deprived Carpenter possession of 
the same by their sale to third parties. (See R page 72). 
H. AS WIFE OF TURRELL, PEGGY TURRELL IS PERSONALLY 
LIABLE TO CARPENTER 
Carpenter named Peggy Turrell as a party and alleged that Turrell's actions 
benefitted the Turrell marital community. While Turrell denied this allegation, Turrell did 
not move the Court at any time during the proceeding to dismiss Peggy Turrell as a 
party defendant. Since this issue was neither raised, argued or addressed at the Trial 
Court, this Court must proceed on the assumption that the Defendant's acts benefitted 
the community and in turn Peggy Turrell. 
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This Court determined that Turrell committed a tort, the conversion of 
Carpenter's buildings. Debts incurred by one spouse in the commission of a tort can be 
satisfied out of community assets. Hansen vs. Blevins, 84 Idaho 49 (1962). While 
alleging that he remitted the proceeds of the sale of Carpenter's building to Marianne 
Turrell, Turrell never produced any verification of this remittance either through a 
deposit slip or by testimony by Marianne Turrell. The receipts signed by Turrell 
personally regarding the conversion and sale of Carpenter's buildings reflect that the 
Turrell community benefitted from Turrell's tortious act. 
I. RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
This Court has previously observed: "Attorney's fees are awardable if an appeal 
does no more than simply invite an Appellant Court to second guess the Trial Court on 
conflicting evidence." Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. vs. Traveler's Leasing 
Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 120 (1990) Anderson vs. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 408 (2001). In 
granting Carpenter's claim for relief, the Trial Court's Findings of Fact was based upon 
testimony and record evidence. In appealing to this Court, Turrell did no more than 
argue the evidence should be reweighed. 
This Court has also previously observed: "An award of Attorney's is appropriate 
'if the law is well settled and the appellants have made no substantial showing at the 
District Court misapplied the law."' Bowles vs. Pro lndiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 378 
(Idaho 1999). As a basis of Turrell's request for this Court's review of the Trial Court's 
opinion, Turrell cites his own testimony, the same being based upon his own 
perceptions, feelings and impressions. Turrell had presented no specific factual 
documentation to sustain the predicate for his legal arguments as presented herein. 
Said legal arguments are unreasonable and irrelevant. While Turrell has attempted to 
show that the Trial Court misapplied the law, he is primarily requesting this Court to 
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reverse the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and adopt his own self serving and "after the 
fact" characterization of his status and role in this particular matter. 
Substantial, competent evidence exists to sustain the Trial Court's finding that 
Carpenter owned the buildings, stored the buildings on the property of Herbert Turrell 
vis a vis a gratuitous bailment status and that Turrell without any prior knowledge, 
consent or authorization of Carpenter assumed dominion and control of the buildings 
and then personally converted the same to his own use and sold them. 
Based upon the authority cited above and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law of the Trial Court, Carpenter respectfully requests that he is entitled to an award 
of attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of this appeal. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the reason and authorities as set forth above, Carpenter requests 
that this Court affirm the Trial Court's decision. Carpenter further requests that he be 
awarded his reasonable attorney's fees and costs in defending this appeal. 
DATED this/ ;;)'t"day of k)<'CS:.,,jz{f'.1 2008. 
- ( 
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